How to use this checklist
Build a practical machine-safety evidence pack that links real tasks and hazards to guards, interlocks, safety functions, emergency stops, safe distances, validation and modification control.
Use it when
- Reviewing an existing machine after purchase, relocation, integration or years of service.
- Assessing a machine after a modification, control-system change or change of product/process.
- Investigating whether guards, interlocks or emergency stops still match the actual hazard zones.
- Checking whether a risk assessment is detailed enough to support action and validation.
Do not use it to
- Treating a CE mark, declaration or manufacturer certificate as the end of the site risk-management process.
- Selecting safety distances from memory without the applicable AS 4024 reach-distance method and measured stopping performance.
- Using emergency stops instead of preventing access to hazardous motion.
- Changing a safety circuit without competent design and validation.
Stop and escalate when
These conditions deserve an explicit competent-person decision rather than being treated as routine checklist gaps.
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A person can reach a hazardous moving part during normal production, cleaning, clearing jams or maintenance.
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A guard or interlock has been bypassed, defeated or modified.
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The machine has been repurposed or made faster/stronger without a documented reassessment.
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The safety function architecture, performance level/integrity requirement or validation basis cannot be established.
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Stop-time or safe-distance assumptions are missing where presence sensing or interlocked access depends on them.
03
Working checklist
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01
1. Establish the current machine baseline
Start with the machine that is actually installed and used. Certificates and manuals are inputs, not substitutes for checking the real configuration.
Identify the machine, serial number, control-system revision, location and current intended use.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forNameplate, asset register, software/control revision and current process description.Typical gapThe certificate relates to the original machine, while the installed machine has different tooling, conveyors or controls.Escalate whenThe current configuration cannot be matched to controlled drawings or manuals.Source basisAS 4024 lifecycle risk-reduction framework and plant record-keeping practice.Collect the manufacturer's declaration/certificate, manuals and original safeguarding information—but treat them as only part of the evidence.
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forControlled copies of declarations, manuals, drawings, safety-function descriptions and test records.Typical gapThe file contains a certificate but no current inspection, risk assessment or proof that the installed configuration matches it.Escalate whenThe certificate excludes the final assembly, integration or local modifications.Source basisAS 4024 risk-reduction process; Safe Work Australia plant-management guidance.Walk down the installed machine against drawings and record every modification, bypass and added interface.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forMarked-up drawings and photographs of guards, sensors, conveyors, robots, tooling and control panels.Typical gapSmall production improvements accumulate until the original risk assessment no longer describes the machine.Escalate whenA modification affects a danger zone, stopping performance or safety-related control function.Source basisAS 4024 iterative risk assessment and control-validation framework.Confirm the actual use, foreseeable misuse and abnormal tasks are documented.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forOperator interviews and task list covering production, setup, cleaning, jam clearing, fault finding and maintenance.Typical gapRisk assessment covers normal automatic operation only.Escalate whenWorkers routinely reach into the machine or defeat a control to complete a task.Source basisAS 4024 hazard analysis across lifecycle tasks; Safe Work Australia plant code.02
2. Test the quality of the risk-assessment record
A useful risk assessment should let another competent reviewer understand the task, hazard, existing controls, decision and required action.
Check the risk assessment identifies the exact machine scope, revision and boundaries.
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forDocument number/revision, asset IDs, included interfaces and excluded systems.Typical gapA generic corporate risk assessment is reused for multiple different machines.Escalate whenThe assessed configuration cannot be matched to the installed machine.Source basisAS 4024 hazard-analysis and risk-assessment process.Check hazards are linked to specific people and tasks across the full machine lifecycle.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forTask/hazard register covering operators, cleaners, maintainers, contractors and foreseeable bystanders.Typical gapHazards are listed by category with no explanation of how exposure occurs.Escalate whenA known high-risk task such as jam clearing is absent.Source basisAS 4024 task-based hazard analysis.Check the assessment records existing controls, risk before/after controls and the basis for any remaining risk.
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forRisk method, control description, residual-risk decision and responsible reviewer.Typical gapThe spreadsheet says 'guarding in place' without identifying which guard controls which hazard.Escalate whenResidual risk is accepted without a documented engineering or management decision.Source basisAS 4024 risk estimation, evaluation and reduction framework.Check actions have owners, due dates and objective close-out evidence.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forAction register linked to photos, drawings, test results or validation records.Typical gapRecommendations are marked complete because hardware was installed, but no one verified the safety function.Escalate whenA critical action is overdue while the machine remains in unrestricted use.Source basisRisk-control implementation and review practice.Confirm the assessment is reviewed after changes, incidents, new hazards or evidence that a control is ineffective.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forRevision history, management-of-change record and triggered review evidence.Typical gapThe original assessment is treated as permanent even after the process, speed or guarding changes.Escalate whenA change likely created a new or different risk and no reassessment occurred.Source basisAS 4024 iterative process; Safe Work Australia requirement to review and revise controls when circumstances change.03
3. Check guards and access to danger zones
The guard should be matched to the hazard, task frequency and access need. A panel that can be reached around or routinely removed is not adequate simply because it is called a guard.
Map every danger zone and every credible route a person can use to reach it.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forMarked-up plan/photos showing front, rear, sides, above, below, openings and adjacent structures.Typical gapThe obvious front access is guarded while the rear conveyor or maintenance gap remains reachable.Escalate whenAny body part can reach a hazardous zone during normal or foreseeable tasks.Source basisAS 4024 hazard-zone identification and safeguarding framework.Check the selected guard type matches access frequency and the need for intervention.
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forTask frequency, guard type, fasteners, interlocks and reason for selection.Typical gapA fixed guard is removed every shift for cleaning, so workers leave it off or replace it incorrectly.Escalate whenThe chosen guard drives routine bypass or unsafe workarounds.Source basisAS 4024 hierarchy and guard-selection principles.Verify openings, gaps and reach-over/reach-under distances against the applicable AS 4024 safe-distance method.Escalation-sensitive
Do not use a single remembered distance. The required separation depends on opening geometry, approach direction and the applicable reach-distance provision.Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forMeasured openings and distances, annotated drawing and referenced calculation/table basis.Typical gapA mesh size is changed or a guard is raised from the floor without recalculating reach access.Escalate whenThe safe-distance basis is missing or the hazard can be reached.Source basisApplicable AS 4024 reach/safety-distance part and machine-specific hazard geometry.Check guard strength, fixing, retention and resistance to foreseeable defeat.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forPhysical inspection, fixing details and condition photographs.Typical gapLight mesh or plastic deflects far enough to contact moving parts; captive fasteners are missing.Escalate whenGuard failure or simple defeat can expose a high-consequence hazard.Source basisAS 4024 guard construction and safeguarding intent.04
4. Check interlocks and safety-related control functions
An interlock is a safety function, not just a sensor. The required behaviour should be defined, implemented and validated.
Define the safety function for each interlocked guard or protective device.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forCause-and-effect or safety requirement specification stating trigger, safe state, reset and restart behaviour.Typical gapThe drawing shows a safety switch but not what hazardous energy it must stop or prevent.Escalate whenThe safe state is ambiguous or depends on ordinary PLC logic with no documented safety basis.Source basisAS 4024 safety-function specification and control-system design process.Verify opening the guard stops or prevents hazardous motion before a person can reach the danger zone.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forMeasured stopping time, access time/separation calculation and functional test.Typical gapInterlock works, but the machine coasts long enough for a person to reach the hazard.Escalate whenStopping performance is unknown or has degraded.Source basisAS 4024 safe-distance and safety-related control validation principles.Verify resetting an interlock or protective device does not automatically restart hazardous motion.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forFunctional test and control-sequence record.Typical gapClosing a gate restores the circuit and the machine resumes automatically.Escalate whenA person can be inside the safeguarded space when reset/restart occurs.Source basisAS 4024 restart-prevention principles and Safe Work Australia plant guidance.Check bypass, muting, override and defeat modes are controlled and documented.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forKey control, password/role management, indicator status, procedures and event logs where applicable.Typical gapA maintenance bypass remains enabled for production because no one owns restoration.Escalate whenA safety device can be defeated easily or without visibility/accountability.Source basisAS 4024 safety-related control and foreseeable misuse principles.Confirm the safety-related control system has a documented design basis and validation result.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forSafety requirements, architecture drawings, calculations/assessment, software records and validation report.Typical gapComponents have safety ratings individually, but the complete safety function was never validated.Escalate whenRequired performance/integrity cannot be demonstrated.Source basisAS 4024 iterative process from risk assessment through safety-function design and validation.05
5. Check emergency stops
Emergency stops are a back-up control. They should work reliably, but they do not replace guarding or other primary risk reduction.
Verify emergency-stop controls are prominent, clearly identified and immediately accessible to the relevant operator(s).Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forLocation plan and functional walk-down from each operating position.Typical gapA stop exists but is behind the operator, blocked by materials or too far from a secondary station.Escalate whenAn operator cannot actuate the stop quickly from a foreseeable hazardous event.Source basisSafe Work Australia plant code emergency-stop requirements; applicable AS 4024 controls provisions.Check the actuator is red and the emergency-stop function is not vulnerable to a simple control-circuit malfunction.
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forPhysical inspection and control-system documentation.Typical gapOrdinary stop and emergency stop are visually similar or share an undocumented non-safety control path.Escalate whenThe emergency-stop architecture is uncertain.Source basisSafe Work Australia plant code and applicable machinery-control requirements.Where multiple emergency stops are fitted, verify activated devices remain in stop/lock-off state until individually reset.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forFunctional test of multiple stations and reset sequence.Typical gapResetting one station clears the whole emergency-stop chain.Escalate whenThe machine can restart while another emergency stop remains activated.Source basisSafe Work Australia plant code multiple emergency-stop provisions.Verify disengaging/resetting an emergency stop does not restart the machine.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forFunctional test from each stop station.Typical gapTwist-release of the button causes immediate motion because the normal start command remains latched.Escalate whenReset alone causes hazardous movement.Source basisSafe Work Australia plant code emergency-stop reset/restart guidance.Verify the stop affects all related equipment whose continued operation could remain dangerous.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forCause-and-effect test covering upstream/downstream conveyors, auxiliaries and stored energy.Typical gapThe main machine stops while a related conveyor, spindle or hydraulic function continues to create risk.Escalate whenThe emergency state leaves hazardous energy or movement uncontrolled.Source basisSafe Work Australia plant code related-equipment stop guidance; machine-specific risk assessment.06
6. Check modifications, repurposing and recommissioning
A machine that was acceptable for one product, speed or task can become unsafe after a seemingly small change.
Confirm every authorised modification has a management-of-change or equivalent technical record.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forChange request, drawings, risk assessment, approvals and as-built close-out.Typical gapGuards and software are changed during breakdown work with no permanent record.Escalate whenThe modification affects a hazard or safety function and no competent review occurred.Source basisAS 4024 iterative risk assessment; Safe Work Australia plant-change guidance.Before repurposing the machine, confirm a competent person assessed whether the proposed use increases risk.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forDocumented assessment of new material, tooling, load, speed, product or operating mode.Typical gapThe machine is used for a new purpose because it physically works, without reassessing hazards.Escalate whenNew use changes energy, ejection, access, loading or operator interaction.Source basisSafe Work Australia plant code on use outside original purpose; AS 4024 risk process.Recalculate safe distances if stopping time, speed, protective-device position or access path changes.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forNew stop-time measurements and revised separation calculation.Typical gapA faster drive is installed but the light curtain remains in the original position.Escalate whenPrevious separation assumptions no longer match current performance.Source basisApplicable AS 4024 safe-distance method and current measured stopping performance.Recommission and validate changed safety functions before unrestricted production.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forTest protocol, results, defects and authorised return-to-service record.Typical gapThe machine is restarted after wiring changes with only a production trial.Escalate whenSafety validation is incomplete or defects remain open.Source basisAS 4024 validation framework; Safe Work Australia commissioning requirements.07
7. Check ongoing owner/user controls
Safety degrades when guards, switches and procedures are not inspected against a defined standard and changed conditions are not reviewed.
Maintain a current inspection register for guards, interlocks, protective devices and emergency stops.Escalation-sensitive
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forAsset list, inspection frequency, responsible person and completed records.Typical gapMaintenance checks lubrication and bearings but not safety-device performance.Escalate whenNo one can show when critical safeguards were last tested.Source basisSafe Work Australia plant code inspection and maintenance register guidance.Regularly inspect and test controls to confirm they remain effective in the current operating environment.
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forFunction tests, stop-time measurements where relevant and defect history.Typical gapA safety switch still changes state, but mechanical wear has changed alignment or stopping time.Escalate whenRepeated faults, nuisance trips or bypasses indicate the control is not reliable in service.Source basisOngoing control-effectiveness review and AS 4024 validation intent.Keep training and procedures aligned with the current machine and current controls.
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forCurrent SOPs, isolation procedures, training matrix and worker consultation records.Typical gapProcedure shows a guard or control layout that no longer exists.Escalate whenWorkers rely on undocumented workarounds.Source basisPlant lifecycle risk management and information/training duties.Retain risk assessments, test results, modifications, inspections and safety-control records as one lifecycle history.
Add measurement, evidence or notes
Inspection guidance and source basis
Evidence to look forIndexed machine safety file or digital asset record.Typical gapCertificates, inspection sheets and change records sit in separate systems and cannot be reconciled.Escalate whenThe current safety basis cannot be reconstructed.Source basisSafe Work Australia plant record-keeping guidance.Overall notes
Record the final screening context
Note operating restrictions, missing documents, work orders, competent-person decisions or assumptions that affect the result.
Minimum useful attachment pack
The checklist is most useful when the evidence can travel with the request.
Five questions before you call it complete
1Does the risk assessment describe the machine that is actually installed today?
2Can every significant hazard be traced to a specific primary control and validation result?
3Would the machine remain safe if a worker performs cleaning, jam clearing or maintenance rather than normal production?
4Have modifications and new uses triggered reassessment rather than relying on the original manufacturer's certificate?
5Can the owner show ongoing inspection and test evidence for critical guards and safety functions?
Common gaps and weak evidence
The file contains a manufacturer's declaration but no current assessment of installed use, modifications, foreseeable misuse or control condition.
Hazards and scores are listed, but they are not linked to specific guards, safety functions, actions or validation evidence.
Workers can reach dangerous motion and the only proposed control is to add another red button.
The machine is upgraded but no new stop-time measurement or separation check is completed.